Introduction
For more than a decade, the Council of Europe has expressed deep concern over irregular migrants' poor access to human rights in Europe.
1 Calls for greater protection, however, have remained largely unanswered owing to the unprecedented problematisation of irregular migration. 2 Irregular migration covers a range of situations which include: clandestine arrival in the host State, staying beyond the permitted period of residence, or working without a permit or in a manner inconsistent with one's immigration status. 3 The term irregular migrant also applies to foreign nationals who enter on false papers, refused asylum-seekers who have exhausted their appeal rights and can no longer remain in the host State, and regularised Both categories of rights may give rise to positive as well as negative obligations. 14 It follows that both are capable of having resource implications. 15 While social rights may be more resource-intensive than civil and political rights, the difference is one of "degree rather than substance". 16 Moreover, objections based on the nature of social rights do not sit well with the integrated approach to interpretation developed by adjudicating bodies, including the 13 For example, "the right to freedom of speech is no more concrete in expression than the right to social security" (M. Langford, 'The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory', in Langford, see supra note 12, p. 30). 14 For example, while the right to a fair trial may place a range of positive obligations on states, the right to housing may require States to exercise restraint. For instance, the right to housing may require States to stay eviction (see e.g. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) ('Grootboom')). 15 For example, the realisation of the right to a fair trial involves significant public spending. 16 M. Langford, 'The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Practice to Theory', in Langford, see supra note 12, p. 30. the premise that adjudication amounts to giving international supervisory bodies the power to make decisions on matters of State social policy. This view, however, is not based on an accurate account of international bodies' role in the adjudication process. Indeed, international rights adjudication is concerned with human rights protection. Consequently, international supervisory bodies' role is not to make policy choices; rather their role is to ascertain whether States' policy decisions are consistent with their human rights obligations.
The approach developed by the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) exemplifies this. As part of its adjudicating role, the ECSR assesses whether States' social policy decisions are congruent with their obligations under the European Social Charter (in its original and revised form) 22 . 23 The ECSR expects States to meet their obligations "within a adjudication. 30 As is the case with the legitimacy objection, the expertise objection rests on the assumption that social rights adjudication grants adjudicating bodies the power to make decisions on social policy. According to this objection, adjudicating bodies lack the necessary expertise to deal with the complex matters that arise in social rights complaints. 31 legal obligations, then they need not be "policy wonks". What is required is essentially the exercise of 'traditional' judicial competences". 32 Besides, "when courts lack technical knowledge, judges can be trained and can hear experts' opinions". 33 Moreover, the expertise objection is particularly hard to sustain in respect of bodies especially set up to adjudicate social rights. 34 Critics of social rights adjudication further point out that adjudicating bodies lack the legitimacy and expertise to tackle issues which have repercussions beyond individual cases and contend that such issues are best left to the State's executive and legislative power. 35 However, I posit that polycentric concerns are overstated in the debate on social rights protection to irregular migrants. 52 The complainant organization argued that reforms to health care provision for irregular migrants in France breached Articles 13 (right to social and medical assistance) and 17 (right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection) of the Revised European Social Charter. 53 The French Government submitted that irregular migrants fell outside the personal scope of the Charter. 54 The ECSR, however, opined that the condition relating to lawful residence only applied to equal treatment with nationals. 55 The Committee asserted that "the Charter must be interpreted so as to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights" and that restrictions on rights must therefore "be read restrictively". The case law of the ECSR shows that international adjudication can play a part in the protection of irregular migrants' social rights. However, it remains the case that these migrants are often reluctant "to pursue legal protections and remedies […], even when their most basic rights are at stake", for fear of coming to the attention of the authorities. 69 Carens rightly points out that immigration enforcement will continue to hinder human rights protection unless a "firewall", based on the principle that "no information gathered by those responsible for protecting and realizing basic human rights can be used for immigration enforcement purposes", is erected. 70 Because irregular migrants' immigration status constrains the realisation and protection of their social human rights, some contend that 63 solutions to irregular migrants' predicament lie with political rather than legal processes.
Ibid. (emphasis added

71
Political processes, however, come with their own drawbacks. For example, a political party that wishes to accede to power or to be re-elected is unlikely to support welfare provision for irregular migrants, especially in times of economic crisis. 72 Mantouvalou observes that politicians are more 'likely to succumb to populist pressures' than judges. 73 Moreover, irregular migrants often lack the political leverage to initiate and shape political solutions.
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In my view, the barriers to access to human rights protection faced by irregular migrants, however, do not negate the value of international adjudication. Besides, it is important to note that international adjudication does not always depend on individuals bringing a complaint.
For example, the collective complaints system of the European Social Charter allows organizations representing employers and employees as well as some NGOs to make complaints. 75 It follows that political processes should complement rather than supplant legal processes.
The ECtHR and protection in the social sphere
The ECHR "guarantees, for the most part, civil and political rights." 76 However, in Airey v.
Ireland, the ECtHR asserted that there could be "no water-tight division" between civil and political rights and social and economic rights. 77 On this basis, the Court held "that the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation". It follows that the Court will, in principle, leave questions involving matters of resource 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. The Court also observed 'that the applicants had access to the standard of health care offered to the general public' and that health care reform had improved their situation (ibid. 111 The case, however, was referred to the Grand Chamber at the request of Latvia. The Grand Chamber agreed that the applicants had endured a period of insecurity and legal uncertainty, but opined that they did not face "any real and imminent risk of deportation" and observed that they had failed to make any attempt to regularise their status in spite of the authorities' recommendations. 112 On this basis, the Grand Chamber held that the options offered by the authorities to the applicants to regularise their immigration status had been "adequate and sufficient" to remedy their Article 8 complaint. 113 While the Grand Chamber concurred that the ECHR could impose an obligation to regularise unlawful stay in particular circumstances, it sought to avoid a "substantive overstretch of Article 8 which the earlier chamber judgment […] might have entailed".
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The question whether Article 8 could give rise to an obligation to regularise illegal stay also arose in expulsion cases concerning parental rights. In this instance, the Court stated that it was in the child's best interests to allow her mother to stay. 117 in that the Court downplayed the importance that it normally accorded to the Government immigration power. The applicants, a mother and daughter, claimed that the child's detention and subsequent deportation to the DRC violated, inter alia, their Articles 3 and 8 rights. 121 The ECtHR found Belgium in breach of both provisions. 122 The ECtHR emphasised that the absolute nature of Article 3 was the "decisive factor" and that "it [took] precedence over considerations relating to the applicant's status as an illegal immigrant." 123 In Polidario v.
Switzerland, the ECtHR departed from its well-established approach in immigration cases in that it did not refer to the State's right to regulate immigration. The Court unanimously held that the Swiss authorities' refusal to issue the applicant with a residence permit over a period of six years breached her right to respect for her family life. 124 The Court emphasised that the respondent State's failure to assist the applicant with the enforcement of her parental rights largely accounted for her illegal presence in Switzerland. 125 The applicant was a national of the Philippines. She had lived in Geneva and had a child with a Swiss national. She had returned to the Philippines with her son because her leave to remain had not been renewed.
The applicant held custody rights and parental authority in respect of the child. The father had been allowed to have his son for the holidays, but had not returned him to the Philippines. All the applicant's attempts to obtain her child's return to the Philippines were unsuccessful. Her requests for leave to remain in Switzerland were all rejected. Custody of the child was subsequently awarded to the father. The applicant was granted access rights which had to be exercised in Switzerland; yet she had no authorisation to stay there. She was only granted a one week visa to attend custody proceedings in Switzerland. The applicant decided to remain in Switzerland illegally in order to exercise her access rights.
These cases show that the ECtHR can reconcile the exercise of the Government immigration power with States' ECHR obligations and consequently protect irregular migrants' ECHR rights. These cases, however, do not signify a shift in the ECtHR's approach in immigration cases in that the State's right to regulate immigration remains the starting point in the Court's reasoning, save where children's basic human rights and their best interests are at stake.
N v. United Kingdom: when immigration status trumps effective protection
It is well-established in the ECtHR's case law that the ECHR has a 'social dimension' and that, whilst the Court upholds States' right to control immigration, irregular immigration status does not, in principle, constitute a bar to protection. It follows that the ECHR is capable of offering protection, albeit limited, to irregular migrants in the social sphere. In this section, however, I posit that the Court's approach in cases on the expulsion of the seriously ill undermines the level of protection that the Convention may afford irregular migrants. 143 It is also well-established in the case law of the Court that States enjoy a wider margin of appreciation in the socio-economic sphere 144 and that this margin is particularly broad in respect of resource allocation issues. 145 Importantly, the Court has always been careful not to place 'an impossible or disproportionate burden' on States. 146 What I take issue with, however, is the significance that the ECtHR accords to resource and immigration policy considerations in N v. United Kingdom. 147 I contend that these considerations are the starting point in the Court's reasoning and that they prompt the Court to depart from principles central to the ECHR.
In the dissenting judges' opinion, the majority were concerned that finding the UK in breach of Article 3 "would open up the floodgates to medical immigration and make Europe vulnerable to becoming the "sick-bay" of the world". 148 The 'floodgate argument' rests on the assumption that welfare provision acts as a pull factor for irregular migration. It is commonly used by Governments to justify curtailments of welfare provision for irregular migrants, in spite of the lack of supportive evidence. 149 Paradoxically, the ECtHR did not engage with the very argument that underpinned its approach. Instead it unreservedly espoused the respondent State's view that health care provision for "aliens without a right to stay" 150 placed a considerable strain on national health care resources and encouraged irregular migration. 151 Significantly, the dissenting judges pointed out that "when one compares the total number of requests received (and those refused and accepted) as against the number of HIV cases, the so-called "floodgate" argument is totally misconceived." 152 160 In Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, six out of seven judges expressed the view that "this extreme severity threshold -to be close to dying" -could not be easily reconciled with the letter and spirit of Article 3, which guarantees an absolute right inherent in human integrity and dignity, and called on the Court to reconsider its approach. 161 Regrettably, the Court adopted the same approach as in N v. United Kingdom, notwithstanding these judges' misgivings. 162 Secondly, the ECtHR balanced the applicant's right not to be subjected to ill-treatment against resource and immigration policy
considerations. Yet it is well-established in the Court's case law, including expulsion cases, that Article 3 rights cannot be balanced against societal interests, no matter how legitimate these may be. 163 The ECtHR (unconvincingly) attempted to find support for its balancing exercise in its case law. Citing its judgment in Soering v. United Kingdom, the Court emphasised that "[i]nherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights." 164 The Court, however, omitted to mention that, in Soering v. United Kingdom, it had also asserted that "the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective." 165 The ECtHR's reasoning in N v. United Kingdom also retreats from the Court's integrated approach to interpretation in that the Court concurs with the respondent State that the ECHR is "essentially directed at the protection of civil and political rights". 166 Ironically, 179 This, for instance, will be the case where the nationality of the individual concerned cannot be ascertained or where the necessary identity documentation cannot be obtained. 180 One category of irregular migrants who might fall outside the scope of this term are migrants who have the right to remain, but are working without a permit or in manner inconsistent with their permit. Moreover, it follows from the ECtHR's case law that the approach developed in N v United Kingdom is unlikely to apply to children (see supra note 11 
